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At least 1 million people in West Africa are impacted by statelessness, with
hundreds of thousands more at risk. While the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness
Conventions offer a blueprint to address this crisis, states continue to
manipulate citizenship laws for strategic bene t. As pressure to ratify human
rights conventions often comes from within, Isabel Paolini examines the historic
contexts of Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire where progress has been made.
International human rights law grapples with an inherent and devastating paradox.
Despite their purported universality, in reality human rights are produced and granted by
states themselves. Nowhere is this tension more apparent than in the condition of
statelessness – de ned by the United Nation’s 1954 Convention as ‘a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.’
At least 1 million people in West Africa are impacted by statelessness, with hundreds of
thousands more at risk. Statelessness in the region emerges from a number of causes,
including discrimination against certain communities, gaps in nationality legislation,
hostile administrative practices, con icting nationality laws between states and the
non-recognition of populations resulting from independence or annexation. Colonial
legacies have further polemicised the question of national identity, framing rights and
citizenship along dichotomies of what have become known as allogène-
autochthone/settler-indigene (‘to be from the soil’/‘stranger’). Ethnic membership, in
particular, has played a decisive role in the denial of citizenship, especially in states
where nationality is derived from jus sanguinis (those born citizens) rather than jus soli
(birth on the territory).
The 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, promoted most recently through the
UNHCR’s #IBelong campaign, offer promising solutions to address and prevent
statelessness in West Africa. My research has sought to uncover factors that drive
states’ rati cation of the conventions, asking: how are states driven to accept
international legal obligations to uphold the human rights of the stateless? What
happens when these obligations come up against traditionally disenfranchising and
discriminatory practices?
Contemporary scholarship largely recognises the rati cation of human rights treaties
as an a rmation of adherence to democratic norms, or as a super cial signalling
device of authoritarians. In examining instances of rati cation in West Africa, however, I
sought to investigate the sociological phenomena at play – examining how polarised
identity and citizenship structures can catalyse structurally-transformative events. I use
William Sewell’s theory to examine instances of civil violence – phenomena intrinsically
linked to notions of citizenship, belonging and national identity – as events capable of
rupturing social structures of belonging, which prompt us to rethink the socio-political
structures that facilitate the rati cation of the Conventions.
Statelessness and conventions in Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s arbitrary citizenship regime constitutes one of the ‘most restrictive
schemes for conferral of nationality in West Africa.’ Making nationality tantamount to
autochthony, policies known as ivoirité alienated millions and transformed identity into
something to be contested. Such discriminatory policies characterised approximately
30% of the population as ‘foreign’ and precipitated substantial statelessness.
In October 2013, however, Côte d’Ivoire rati ed the Statelessness Conventions, which I
argue arose from 2010-11 post-election violence that catalysed reform of these
identity-based discrimination structures.
The 2010-11 inter-communal violence was sparked by the election of Alassane
Ouattara, which represented a radical empowerment of a ‘foreigner’ and the national
shift towards democracy, and galvanised structural, societal shifts. There was a direct
correlation between Ivorian structures of exclusion and violence. This civil con ict
revealed the unsustainability of the country’s nationality laws, generating the demand
for novel, inclusionary structures and an unease of those deemed draconian and
exclusionary.
Questions of statelessness were central to the country’s systemic inter-communal
violence, with reform to fractured structures of nationality and identity the crux of
Ouattara’s strategy to mitigate such violence. Because the 2010-11 events emerged
from structural foundations entrenched in polemic contestations over citizenship,
ratifying the Conventions became a necessary, symbolic tool of national reuni cation
and structural re-articulation. Ouattara asserted:
‘the political crisis that overcame our country and led to armed con ict in
September 2002 brought to the agenda the question of the abnormally prolonged
alien status of certain populations who, despite having totally integrated into the
Ivorian social fabric and consider themselves as Ivorians, remain as a matter of law
non-nationals, but without having another nationality.’
Nigeria’s nationality legislation and inter-communal violence
Nigerian socio-political structures of indigeneity have also created inter-communal
hostility, which civil con icts over decades have highlighted as in need of reform. Due
to the lack of formal legislation or statutory citizenship de nitions, the right to be
Nigerian has been epitomised by certi cates of indigeneity which, analogous to Côte
d’Ivoire, is a nebulous system manipulated by Nigerian politicians that fuels further
con ict. Non-indigenes are thus condemned to an ‘effectively stateless’ position,
forging similar barriers as ivoirité to belonging and citizenship rights.
This tension peaked following the election of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011. Similar to
Ouattara’s election, Jonathan’s contested victory breached traditional identity structures
and catalysed a wave of inter-communal violence. As a minority Ijaw Christian from the
majority-Christian south, his presidency undermined the traditional ‘zoning’ agreement
in which the majority-Muslim north and majority-Christian south took turns assuming
o ce. Following his election, protests in the Kaduna and Plateau states escalated into
identity-based violence, ultimately displacing over 65,000 people.
As discriminatory nationality policies contributed to this violence, the new regime
needed to re-articulate social structures governing citizenship status. The rati cations
of the Conventions were, therefore, integral components of these executive-level
structural reforms to heal sectarian social rifts, and they embodied Nigeria’s normative
socialisation to provide broader recognition and protection for the stateless. Nigeria’s
submissions to the Ministerial Conference on Statelessness reveal these domestic
stability-related motivations: ‘Based on its security context, Nigeria indicated that
identity and citizenship lie at the heart of its national concerns…. identity is a national
priority.’
Resolving statelessness is an urgent mission – both to protect the human rights of the
world’s most vulnerable and to maintain regional peace and security. The
disenfranchisement and persecution of stateless persons sparks tension between
communities, exacerbated by the devastating colonial legacy in Africa which has
grounded conceptions of citizenship in ethnicity, belonging and land. As the ACHPR
asserts:
‘The refusal to grant nationality… has been the root of con icts that have
engendered some of the most serious human rights violations this continent has
experienced over the last decade.’
Examining the factors motivating the Conventions’ rati cations teaches us about how
the international community can expand rati cation, not only to end the contemporary
crisis of statelessness but also to prevent avoidable regional con icts.
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